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ABSTRACT. Infrastructure, as it impacts transport costs, is crucial in determining
equilibrium outcomes in spatial competition; however, infrastructure investment is
typically exogenous. Our political economy analysis of infrastructure choice is based
upon consumer preferences derived from Salop’s circular city model. In this setting,
infrastructure investment has two effects: it directly lowers costs to consumers and
indirectly affects market power. We show how political support for infrastructure in-
vestments depends crucially on the details of the market. Competition boosts popular
support for infrastructure — often excessively so — while collusion leads to underin-
vestment. The uncertainty produced by infrastructure induced entry leads to traps
and thresholds.
Keywords: Spatial Competition, Infrastructure Investment, Salop’s circular city, Vot-
ing, Referendum.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the original interpretations of transportation costs in the spatial competi-
tion framework is as a reﬂection of transport infrastructure:
“These particular merchants would do well, instead of organising im-
provement clubs and booster associations to better the roads, to make
transportation as difﬁcult as possible.” Hotelling (1929, page 50).
Implicit in this quote is a recognition of the pro-competitive nature of the trans-
port infrastructure in the model. Since the transport costs determine participation,
substitutability and hence competition in a market, one can interpret infrastructure
quite broadly as physical (e.g. roads and telecommunications) as well as institutional
(e.g. trade liberalization, contract enforcement, anti-trust regulation and banking
sector reforms).
Although the spatial competition literature shows the impact of infrastructure on
individual welfare, it typically treats the level of infrastructure as exogenous. See, for
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example, Anderson et al (1992), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992), Anderson et al (1997),
and Meagher and Zauner (2004) among others. In this paper we develop a political
economy framework which shows how individual voting can be used to determine the
public provision of infrastructure in Salop’s “circular city” spatial market.
In our approach, citizens play a dual role as both consumers and voters/taxpayers;
as a result, their endogenous voting preferences depend intimately on the details of
competitive conditions in the product market. Infrastructure investment has two ef-
fects in the product market: it directly lowers costs to consumers and it indirectly af-
fects market power. These market-based effects of infrastructure investments on con-
sumers are heterogeneous because consumer locations are heterogeneous. The tax-
based effects on citizens are unambiguously negative because taxes must increase in
order to pay for the investment (we preclude the bundling of redistribution policies
with the infrastructure funding).
Voting is analysed through two related political paradigms — (i) pairwise voting
process in a representative democracy, which produces a Condorcet winner when in-
dividuals vote sincerely for their preferred level of infrastructure and (ii) what ap-
pears to be a new set based approach to represent a referendum in a representative
democracy where individuals vote yes or no for a proposed increase from the status
quo level of infrastructure provision.
Almost by deﬁnition, infrastructure improves the performance of individual mar-
kets and hence in aggregate the performance of an economy. Empirical studies are
typically not at the level of the individual consumers and ﬁrms considered in our
model; nonetheless, macro empirical estimates indicate the effects of infrastructure
can be large. In a seminal paper, Aschauer (1989) showed that public capital, es-
pecially core infrastructure (roads, utility networks, etc.) had a strong role in de-
termining productivity. Similarly, Fernald (1999) found that the construction of the
interstate road network had a large one off impact on growth. R¨ oller and Waverman
(2001) showed that about one-third of growth in OECD countries over the period
1971–90 can be attributed to telecommunications investment. Czernich et al (2011)
found a 10 percentage point increase in broadband penetration raised annual per
capita growth by 0.9–1.5 percentage points.
These empirical models, though sophisticated in their treatment, are too macro-
scopic to show who beneﬁts from infrastructure and how these individual beneﬁts
result in government investment decisions. In line with the theoretical move to aug-
ment the traditional social planner approach with a more realistic political economy
approach (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Winer and Hettich, 2004),
a recent empirical literature has considered the political dimensions of public infras-
tructure expenditure. Papers such as Knight (2004) and Cadot et al (2006) provide
signiﬁcant evidence that government expenditure on infrastructure is directed by selfPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 3
interested politicians to please key voters rather than to maximise social welfare. Ev-
idence that policy is distorted to meet the interests of powerful lobby groups is not
conclusive for the simple reasons that lobbying is typically hard to observe and the
interests of ﬁrms are hard to identify.
Analyzing voting over infrastructure, we ﬁnd that when market structure is ex-
ogenous, competition boosts popular support for infrastructure —often excessively
so—while collusion often leads to underinvestment. Infrastructure trap—a situation
in which no investment in infrastructure is made despite the existence of social wel-
fare enhancing investment—is common under collusion. Traps and thresholds arise
under competition when market structure is endogenously determined through entry
and exit. It is the uncertainty caused by infrastructure induced entry, that leads to
traps and thresholds.
Infrastructure appears in a number of micro economic models. Transportation
infrastructure plays an important role in urban economics, predominantly through
commute times. Although this large literature also uses spatial techniques, and oc-
casionally political economy, it is most deﬁnitely not a branch of oligopoly theory
and hence is mute on the competitive aspects of infrastructure which we investigate
here.
1 Aghion and Schankerman (2004) consider some aspects of competition; how-
ever, rather than analyzing voting, they consider how differential producer interests,
based on asymmetric production costs, impact on regulation. Free entry and uncer-
tainty, which are the key to traps and thresholds under competition in our frame-
work, are not considered in Aghion and Schankerman (2004).
Individual uncertainty, in the context of public goods, is considered in Jain and
Mukand (2003). The public good is valued directly as an input to a production func-
tion, as opposed to our approach which distinguishes infrastructure as a conduit for
accessing the market. Individual uncertainty in their two-sector model is a random
cost of switching to work in a different sector. Thus uncertainty has nothing to do
with the public good. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show how individual speciﬁc un-
certainty can stall reforms and generate status quo bias even if a majority beneﬁt
from the reforms ex-post. Key to our infrastructure traps—akin to status quo bias—
are the details of market environment which have little role to play in Fernandez
and Rodrik (1991) and Jain and Mukand (2003). Status quo bias is also considered
in Majumdar and Mukand (2004). Political economy forces also generate this bias in
1Felbermayr (2006) introduces transport infrastructure in a multi-country trade setting and shows that
infrastructure investments are often suboptimal because the independent governments ignore positive
externalities of infrastructure projects on foreign consumers. The effects of multiple jurisdictions on
infrastructure are also considered by Ghosh et al (2007) in the context of country integration. To high-
light the subtle interaction between the market environment and political economy, we abstract from
the multiple jurisdiction issue as it provides a separate rationale for suboptimal investment, even when
political economy concerns are absent.4 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
their model, but the driver of inefﬁcient policy choice is a government’s reputation
rather than voter heterogeneity.
While spatial models are used extensively in the industrial organization literature,
the underlying infrastructure provision, as well as the institutional details determin-
ing the provision, are treated as exogenous. On the other hand the public economics
literature, despite its richness in tax and voting structures, has typically not anal-
ysed spatial markets. By embedding voting over infrastructure in spatial oligopoly
models we provide an explicit link between market environment and infrastructure.
The link between infrastructure and prices is not only of theoretical interest but is
also of practical concern to policy makers:
“The obvious beneﬁt to regional Australia lies in the continuing reduc-
tion of the cost of transporting goods ... will increase the scope for com-
petitive pricing ... [and] should eventually result in price reductions at
the consumer level.”
2
In the subsequent sections, in all scenarios, there exist strictly positive investment
levels that increase aggregate surplus. This suggests that the results arise for po-
litical economy reasons rather than from the existence of ﬁxed costs or increasing
returns. Though it is well known in general that political outcomes can differ from
the social optimum, to our knowledge, our work is the ﬁrst to explore how the differ-
ence between the two depend on the subtleties of the market environment within a
voting setup.
2. A MODEL OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT
Following Salop (1979), assume that a unit mass of consumers is uniformly dis-
tributed around a circle C of circumference 1 with density 1, which can be interpreted
either geographically or as a type space. The locations of consumers y are described
in a clockwise manner starting from 12 o’clock. Assume there are n ﬁrms, with the
location of ﬁrm i denoted by xi. We will make the standard assumption that ﬁrms
are evenly dispersed around the circle.3
Assume that the n(> 1) ﬁrms produce a product with marginal cost m  0 and
ﬁxed cost K. Each consumer buys either zero or one unit of the product which yields
gross utility of A per unit of consumption. If a consumer living at y purchases from
ﬁrm i then he incurs a price of pi and a transport cost or utility loss of tjy xij (  1).
Consumer y’s net utility from consumption of good i, denoted by vi(y) is given by
(2.1) vi(y) = A   p   tjy   xij;
2This statement by the South Australian Government is taken from the Productivity Commission report
(1999).
3Economides (1989) shows that this is the unique symmetric equilibrium in a location-then-price game.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 5
where the distance jy   xij is measured around the circumference of the circle. The
consumers have a generic outside option, whose utility we normalize to zero and they
choose whichever option yields the highest net utility. This implies that a consumer
y purchases product i as long as vi(y)  0 and vi(y)  vj(y);j 6= i.
We interpret the transport cost parameter t as an index of infrastructure. More
speciﬁcally, we consider a reduction in t as resulting from an investment in infras-
tructure. The interpretation is quite natural in the geographical context where im-
provements in roads or rail connections, or the construction of a freeway system,
lead to lower physical transportation costs. More generally we might think of the
consumers being located in a characteristic space. Aghion and Schankerman (2004)
suggest that the transportation cost parameter in a characteristic space measures
the level of competition between ﬁrms. As a result, they assert t would be reduced by
infrastructure investments which increase competition, for example law and order,
or anti-trust regulation and enforcement.
We assume t is determined by consumers/voters through a political process, which
we describe below. Starting from an initial t0, an investment of I  0 reduces trans-
port cost to t0 I. An investment of amount I costs
I2
2 and is ﬁnanced by a lumpsum
tax of g per consumer. Since there is a unit mass of consumers, the total tax revenue
is g:1 = g as well. We assume that the proceeds from the lumpsum tax cannot be
used for redistributive purposes. This implies that in equilibrium g =
I2
2 . The tax g
or equivalently the level of investment I is determined by political process.
The sequence of events is as follows. Given some status quo t0, the political process
determines the level of infrastructure investment I which determines transport cost
t = t0   I. Subsequently, ﬁrms set prices, then consumers make their purchasing
decisions.
In order to focus on the voting behavior of consumers, we assume that proﬁts, if
any, accrue to a measure zero elite.4 In the absence of shareholding by consumers,
surplus of a consumer y, denoted by S(y;I), is the indirect utility from consumption
less tax, i.e.




2.1. Aggregate Surplus Measures. Though the individual surplus measure de-
termines the voting behavior of an individual, the cost-beneﬁt comparison requires
4The results are qualitatively unchanged if a small fraction of the shares are held by a unit mass of
consumers and there is no heterogeneity (across consumers) in shareholding. However, the analysis is
cleaner if all the shares belong to a measure zero elite, as we assume to be the case in the main text. The
assumption on shareholding accords well with the ﬁndings in developing countries where shareholding
is extremely skewed. In developed countries many people who hold shares do so through pension funds
or unit trusts due to the cost saving of delegated diversiﬁcation or regulation. One observed consequence
of the diffusion of ownership and the ensuing free rider problems is that most individuals do not exercise
any effective inﬂuence over the management of the ﬁrms in which they hold shares.6 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
aggregate measures. Two aggregate surplus measures are introduced below. The
measures are deﬁned generally so that they can be used for comparison in the later






The second measure, aggregate social surplus, denoted by W(I), is the sum of aggre-
gate consumer surplus S(I) and aggregate proﬁts :
(2.4) W(I) = S(I) + (I):
Note (I) 
Pn
i=1 i(I), where i(I) denotes ﬁrm i’s proﬁt for a given investment
level I.
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY
At regional or local levels or even at a country level (especially if the country is
small), proposals are often put forward in a popular vote or referendum (see Catt,
1999). For example, in September 2003, the residents of Hampton Roads and North-
ern Virginia voted on whether to raise sales tax to fund the improvements and exten-
sion of existing roads in the area. In September 2002, Mexico City voted on a double
deck road plan which promised to relieve the trafﬁc crisis by building elevated free-
ways over a crosstown artery. Examples of referendum also exist on telecommunica-
tion related issues in Slovenia, electricity liberalization in Switzerland, etc. We use
referendum in our analysis, not only because some of the decision making or decision
approval occur in reality in this fashion, but also because theoretically it provides
a useful reﬁnement of the set of proposals in absence of a priori position selection
mechanisms.
In the current context, the referendum on infrastructure works as follows. A posi-
tive level of income tax g =
I2
2 is proposed to ﬁnance an infrastructure investment of
amount I which lowers the transport cost from t0 to t0   I. The proposal is passed in
the referendum if at least 50% of the consumers/voters vote in favor of the proposal
against the status quo I = 0.
A consumer y votes in favor of a proposed investment level I1 over the alternative
I2 if and only if s(y;I1)  s(y;I2). Let m(I1;I2) denote the measure of consumers who
vote in favor of the proposal I1 over the alternative investment level I2. We deﬁne R0
as the set of investment levels which a majority of voters favour over the status quo
I2 = 0, i.e.
(3.1) R0 = fI : m(I;0) 
1
2
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In order to understand the extent of distortion in the political outcomes, we consider
two benchmarks based on the surplus measures S(I) and W(I) introduced previously.
(3.2) S0 = fI : S(I)   S(0)  0g
(3.3) W0 = fI : W(I)   W(0)  0g
The set S0 (W0) consists of investment levels for which the aggregate consumer sur-
plus (social surplus) is higher compared to the status quo.
Following the standard practice in the voting literature, in the pairwise voting
scenario, we use the concept of a Condorcet winner. Excluding abstention, I is a
Condorcet winner if m(I;I)  1
2 for all I 6= I. To determine whether political
outcomes yield “underprovision” or “overprovision” of investment, we compare I with
aggregate consumer surplus maximizing investment level
(3.4) Is = argmax
I0
S(I)
and social surplus maximizing investment level
(3.5) Iw = argmax
I0
W(I):
Two common features across the models in different sections are that (i) S(I) and
W(I) are continuous in I and (ii) S0 and W0 are compact, which guarantee the exis-
tence of Is and Iw.
4. SPATIAL COMPETITION
In this section we assume that the number and locations of ﬁrms are ﬁxed, which is
appropriate for analyzing situations involving sunk costs, entry barriers or the short
run. The spatial competition between ﬁrms arising from locational differences links
equilibrium prices to the level of infrastructure. As a consequence, when voting, a
consumer not only has to consider the effect of infrastructure investment on transport
costs but also its effect on prices.
4.1. Price Equilibria: We assume that the gross utility from consuming a vari-
ety, A, is high enough (or equivalently t0 is low enough) such that each consumer
buys some variety and ﬁrms directly compete with their neighbors.5 We also assume
equally spaced ﬁrms on the circle, with 1    6:2, in order to guarantee the exis-
tence of the unique symmetric price equilibrium (see Anderson et al., 1992, pp. 177):
(4.1) p(I) = c +
21 (t0   I)
n :
5If A is low, then each ﬁrm becomes a local monopolist. Monopoly power is considered in section 5.8 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
Note that p(I) is decreasing in I reﬂecting the fact that an increase in investment
level, i.e. a reduction in t, creates more competition among the existing ﬁrms, which
in turn leads to lower equilibrium prices.
4.2. Political Economy Results. Recall the individual surplus measure, s(y;I), in-
troduced in section 2, substituting p = p(I) from equation (4.1), for a consumer y 2 C
we have:






i is the location of the ﬁrm nearest to consumer y.
Since the n ﬁrms are equally spaced around the circle and the equilibrium prices
are identical, it sufﬁces to consider a mass of 1
2n consumers all located on one side of
a representative ﬁrm whose location is normalised to 0. A consumer y 2 [0; 1
2n] votes
against the status quo if




Observe that s(y;I)   s(y;0) exhibits single crossing in y. Thus by an application
of Gans and Smart (1996) the voting behavior of the median voter is sufﬁcient to
determine the voting behavior of the majority.6 Noting that jyj = 1
4n is the median



















Solving this inequality for I characterizes the investment levels which will win in
a referendum. It also follows from single crossing and Gans and Smart (1996) that
the most preferred investment level of the median consumer is the unique Condorcet
winner. The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In a circular city model, with n  2 ﬁrms, voting on infrastructure





The set of investment R0 which dominate the status quo is R0 = [0;2I]
By inspection I is decreasing in  and n.  determines the rate at which marginal
cost increases, thus quite naturally as the marginal cost of infrastructure increases,
the equilibrium choice decreases.
6Also see pp 23, Chapter 2 in Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a deﬁnition and implication of the single-
crossing property.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 9
Increased n, an exogenous increase in the number of ﬁrms, lowers the distance
travelled by the median consumer which in turn reduces the direct marginal beneﬁt





n , is decreasing in n. Hence on both counts, the incentive to
invest becomes smaller as the number of ﬁrms increases.
Finally, we turn to comparative statics with respect to , the convexity of the
transport cost function. The direct marginal beneﬁt of an increase in I is (4n) ,




(2n) which becomes smaller as  increases. Thus I is decreasing in
.
4.3. Welfare Results. Substituting s(y;I) as given by equation (4.2) into the deﬁni-
tions of S and W gives














We begin by determining S0 and W0, respectively the set of I that improves ag-
gregate consumer surplus and welfare compared to the status quo. Using equations
(4.5) and (4.6) gives the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In a circular city model, with n  2 ﬁrms, the investment levels which
maximize consumer surplus Is and welfare Iw are
Is =







The set of investments which increases consumer surplus, over the status quo, is S0 =
[0;2Is] and the set of investments which increases welfare is W0 = [0;2Iw]
Comparing W0 and S0 it follows that W0  S0. The reasoning is simple. An in-
crease in investment level increases S(I) through two channels - reduction in equilib-
rium prices and reduction in aggregate transport costs. Change in price do not affect
W(I). This implies that, corresponding to any change in I, the increase in W(I) is
less than the increase in S(I) and accordingly any investment level that increases ag-
gregate social surplus increases aggregate consumer surplus as well. In other words,
W0  S0. This argument, appropriately modiﬁed, applies to marginal changes in I
too. Since marginal increase in W(I) is less than that of S(I), and W(I) and S(I)10 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
are strictly concave, it follows that Iw < Is. A complete comparison of welfare and
equilibrium outcomes is given by the following proposition.7
Proposition 3. In a circular city model, with n  2 ﬁrms, voting will lead to over
investment:
Iw < I  Is (4.9)
W0  R0  S0 (4.10)
where equality holds only for  = 1.
The savings in transport costs for the median consumer, due to improved infras-
tructure, is less than the average savings. This implies that there are investment
levels I which increase S(I) but are not favored by the median consumer, and accord-
ingly not supported by the majority. Hence R0  S0. Since the savings are valued
similarly in W0 and S0, the argument described above would suggest that R0  W0
as well. However, recall that the change in aggregate social surplus, W(I)   W(0),
does not take into account the beneﬁcial effect of price reduction due to improved
infrastructure. This enlarges the set R0, and in fact for the speciﬁcation chosen, it
turns out that W0  R0. Similar arguments can be used to establish the ordering of
the investment levels in (4.9).
5. COLLUSION
We take a simple approach to collusion in which the number of ﬁrms, n is ﬁxed. We
derive the single price that ﬁrms set in the market, assuming they are able to collude
perfectly.8
Given the underlying symmetric structure of the model, there is a unique collusive
price, which is increasing in I (as the following lemma shows).








This price is just high enough to reduce the utility of a marginal consumer —
midway between two ﬁrms — to zero. The gross value of the product A is sufﬁciently
high, relative to costs, to make it unattractive for ﬁrms to set a price which excludes
any consumer from the market.
In collusion, for pivotal consumers, the loss from increased price exactly offsets the
gain from transport cost savings. All other consumers are made strictly worse off by
7Qualitatively Is(orIw) vary with n,  and  in the same way was as I
 does and the arguments are
similar to those presented immediately after Proposition 3.
8Implicit in this derivation is an assumption that discount rates are high enough to sustain collusion or
there exists some other collusive mechanism. The impact of infrastructure on the functioning of cartels
is left for future research.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 11
improving infrastructure. This exploitative aspect of infrastructure under collusion
leads to the following:
Proposition 4. Collusion in the circular city framework causes an infrastructure
trap:
R0 = S0 = f0g  W0 (5.1)
I = Is = 0 < Iw (5.2)
Comparing Propositions 1 and 4 highlights the importance of market reforms in
generating popular support to undertake infrastructure improvements. Even though
welfare improving changes exist, in the absence of competition, those changes might
not be politically viable. For many years, global institutions such as the World Bank,
have pushed for market reforms before providing any aid in terms of infrastructure
improvements. Our framework provides an explicit link between the two and sug-
gests that indeed market structure (or more generally market environment) has im-
portant bearings on support for infrastructure provision.
6. FREE ENTRY
6.1. Free Entry Equilibrium. In our analysis so far, the number and locations
of ﬁrms were assumed to be given. The assumption is appropriate for short run
analysis, but, in the long run, ﬁrms can change locations and furthermore entry and
exit may occur in the industry.9 To incorporate these features into our framework
and to examine the consequent effects on the voting outcome, we consider a free
entry version of our model.
On the production side, in addition to constant marginal cost, we also assume posi-
tive ﬁxed cost of production K > 0. Consider a sequential game, where corresponding
to a given level of infrastructure provision t = t0   I, a ﬁrm i ﬁrst decides whether to
enter and subsequently post-entry it chooses location (xi) and then price (pi). If ﬁrms
choose simultaneously at each stage and n ﬁrms have entered in the ﬁrst stage, the
location and price of ﬁrm i in the unique symmetric equilibrium, denoted by  xi and
 pi respectively, are as follows (see Economides, 1989 and Anderson et al, 1992):








Treating n as a continuous variable, the free-entry number of ﬁrms corresponding
to a given level of investment I, denoted by n(I) is obtained from solving the zero
9Note if ﬁxed costs are sunk on entry, then the short run analysis is the same as the long run analysis
because infrastructure investment increases competition which lowers proﬁts.12 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
proﬁts condition ( p(n)   c) 1








For a given I  0, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the three-stage
game — entry (stage 1), location choice (stage 2) and price competition (stage 3) —
can be summarized by a triplet (n(I);fx
i(I)g
n(I)
i=1 ;p(I)) where n(I) is as in equation
(6.3), and x
i(I) and p(I) are  xi and  pi respectively evaluated at n = n(I).
6.2. Welfare and Uncertainty. Suppose the initial level of infrastructure provision




i=1 and p(0) respectively. While voting for I > 0, a consumer y cor-
rectly anticipates n(I) and p(I). However, since any equispaced location of n(I)
ﬁrms constitutes an equilibrium, a consumer computes the expected utility over all
possible distances jy x
i(I)j where x
i(I) denotes the location of the nearest ﬁrm. As-
suming a uniform prior for equilibrium distance jy x
i(I)j over the support [0; 1
2n(I)],
the expected surplus from an investment I > 0 is:




jy   xijdxi  
I2
2








We use a constrained optimal approach to welfare in considering free entry—
constrained in the sense that we take as given the way in which market forces deter-
mine equilibrium prices and the equilibrium number of ﬁrms. This seems a natural
way to examine in isolation the distortions caused by the political process in deter-
mining infrastructure investments.
Since s(y;I) =  S(I) for all y on the circle C, and there is a unit mass of consumers,
it follows that S(I) =  S(I). Moreover, since proﬁts are zero in free-entry equilibrium,
the two aggregate surplus measures are equivalent: W(I) = S(I) =  S(I) for all I > 0.
This equivalence in turn implies that for all   1,
W0 = S0  f0g; (6.5)
Iw = Is = argmax
I0
 S(I) > 0: (6.6)
As in the previous sections, the existence of strictly positive, surplus enhancing I,
follows from the observation that inﬁnitesimally small levels of I have zero cost and
W(I) and S(I) are continuous in I for all I  0. However, those surplus enhancing I
are politically viable only if
 S(I)   s(ymedian;0) > 0;POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 13
where ymedian is the location of the median consumer. To check whether this inequal-
ity holds, we ﬁrst compute s(y;0) and then identify the median consumer.
Note that if no investment is undertaken and the status quo is preserved it is
natural to assume that the ﬁrms maintain the initial locations. This yields
(6.7) s(y;0) = A   p(0)   t0jy   x
i(0)j:
Since s(y;I) =  S(I) for all y when I > 0, and s(y;0) is decreasing in y it follows that
s(y;I)   s(y;0) =  S(I)   s(y;0)
is increasing in y. Exploiting this, it can be shown that, I > 0 beats the status quo if
and only if the median consumer votes against the status quo. The relevant median
is the one with respect to initial equilibrium conﬁguration, which means that the
median consumer(s) is located at distance 1
4n(0) from the nearest ﬁrm.
6.3. Political Economy Results. Having identiﬁed the relevant aspects of the pref-
erences of voters, we now turn to some results. An interesting and somewhat surpris-
ing property of the free entry model is the following threshold result.
Proposition 5 (Referendum Threshold). For all  > 1, there exists a threshold
I() > 0 such that investments below the threshold cannot beat the status quo in a
referendum, i.e. if I < I() then I = 2 R0.
Inﬁnitesimally small levels of investment decrease the transportation costs at each
location by an inﬁnitesimal amount. At the same time, they cause ﬁrms to shift
in the long run so the median consumer now faces the average transportation cost
which is higher than the median transportation cost. As I ! 0, p(I) ! p(0) and
n(I) ! n(0), implying that the indirect effects that work through price reduction or
entry/exit are negligible. However, the negative effect of increased expected transport
costs arising as a result of switching from median to average does not vanish as long
as  > 1. This in turn implies that unless the proposed investment level is higher
than a certain threshold ,it could not win a referendum. Thus, our referendum can
generate an endogenous investment threshold — a feature which typically arises in
the presence of ﬁxed costs and/or increasing returns. Also note that this threshold
feature is only reﬂected in R0 and not in W0 or S0 which once again highlights the
qualitative differences between socially beneﬁcial and politically viable outcomes.
Proposition 5 shows that I > 0 is politically viable only if I > I. On the other
hand, I cannot be too large either, since  > 0. Let  I() denote the upper bound of
politically viable investments. Indeed, if  is suitably large there does not exist any I
that satisﬁes both: I < I and I >  I.
Proposition 6 (Free Entry Infrastructure Trap). For all  > 1 there exists a  ()
such that if  >  () there is an infrastructure trap: R0 = f0g and I = 0.14 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
Previously we showed that an infrastructure trap can arise due to collusion/monopoly,
but here, the cause is different. The uncertainty regarding the distance ex post —in
particular the possibility that distance can increase — renders small changes polit-
ically non-viable and if  is suitably large, the moderate or high level of investment
levels are not feasible either, leading to the “trap” or persistence of the status quo.
In the context of trade policy reforms in a competitive general equilibrium model,
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) obtained a bias for the status quo trade policy. Like our
trap result, their status quo bias arises from individual speciﬁc uncertainty. How-
ever, the context as well as the focus of their paper is quite different from ours. For
example, market environment has little role to play in their model. Furthermore, the
threshold result (Proposition 5), offers a novel insight regarding the set of politically
viable outcomes.
A comparison of the welfare optimal results and the political economy results is
given in the following proposition for a strictly convex transport cost function.
Proposition 7. In a circular city model with free entry, if the transport cost function
is strictly convex (i.e.  > 1) then there exists  () such that
(i) if    () then f0g  R0  S0 = W0 and I = Is = Iw > 0,
(ii) while if  >  () then R0 = f0g  S0 = W0 and I = 0 < Is = Iw.
The relationships between S0 and W0, Is and Iw as well as the “trap” for large  (i.e.
part (ii) of Proposition 7) has already been explained in this section. What remains
to be explained is the political outcome when  is small, i.e.    . Recall that, for
I > 0, each individual’s (and hence the median voter’s) expected consumer surplus
is the same as the consumer surplus for the population. This in turn implies that
the political outcome from the electoral competition setting (i.e. Condorcet winner) is
socially optimal, if there exists I that wins a referendum. Such I exists if    .
Despite the identical point outcomes (i.e. I = Is = Iw), the set of politically viable
investments, R0, is strictly smaller than the set of welfare enhancing investments
(S0 or W0). The median transportation cost is lower than the average transportation
costs under t = t0 and accordingly the net beneﬁt from a positive investment is valued
less by the median consumer. This explains the strict inclusion: R0  B0 — the
existence of I that improves welfare and yet immiserizes the median consumer.
Finally, note that under linear transport costs and uniform distribution of con-
sumers, socially desirable investments are also politically viable and vice versa.
Proposition 8 (Equivalence under Linearity). In a circular city model with free
entry, if the transport cost function is linear (i.e.  = 1) then R0 = S0 = W0 and
I = Is = Iw > 0.
In this case, the median voter’s transport costs are the same as the average transport
costs and hence the median voter behaves in a socially optimal way.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 15
7. CONCLUSION
Despite the importance of public infrastructure investments, theory, especially
with regard to competition, is underdeveloped. We consider a spatial competition
model where we interpret the transport cost parameter as an index of infrastructure.
By incorporating voting over infrastructure by consumers, we provide an explicit po-
litical economy foundation for infrastructure investment. As one might expect, po-
litical processes do not necessarily generate socially optimal or efﬁcient outcomes.
However, as our analysis shows, the source and magnitude of the inefﬁciency depend
in subtle ways on the characteristics of the market environment.
We analyze a number of aspects of the market environment: market structure
(competition versus collusion/monopoly); transport cost curvature (linear versus strictly
convex); and entry (short run versus long run). Across the models, competition was
infrastructure promoting (excessively so) while collusion and the uncertainty caused
by free entry both led to infrastructure traps: choice of zero infrastructure investment
in a referendum or election where positive investment is socially optimal.
By focusing on consumers and voting, we have ignored the other side of the story:
producers and the political apparatus they employ to protect their proﬁts — lobbying.
In the applied literature (e.g. trade policy literature) the presence of lobbying is often
captured by considering weighted social surplus as the objective function, with proﬁts
being assigned higher weights than aggregate consumer surplus.10 Our preliminary
investigation suggests that inefﬁciencies and the possibility of an infrastructure trap
exist under this setting as well.
Though we covered some distance in the analysis of market environments — com-
petition, collusion and free entry— on the political economy front we have been more
selective. Two recent advances, in modelling electoral competition, which we do not
consider, are the citizen-candidate framework, ` a la Besley and Coate (1997) or Os-
borne and Slivinski (1996) and the party competition approach of Roemer (2001) and
Levy (2004). However, we would like to highlight the novelty our analysis offers by
considering both point outcomes (e.g. electoral competition) as well as set outcomes
(e.g. referendum outcomes). As we have shown, the referendum set can display
unique features which cannot be described with point outcomes (e.g. investment
thresholds). Also, the comparison between referendum and surplus enhancing sets
does not necessarily mirror the results from the electoral competition setting. For
example in Proposition 7(i), there is strict equality in the point outcomes, I = Is,
while the corresponding set outcomes do not exhibit equality, R0  S0.
By endogenizing the transport cost parameter as a politically determined infras-
tructure investment, we allow consumers, in their dual role as voters, to partially
10See Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Mitra (2001) for a microfoundation of this approach.16 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
determine the environment they face when they make purchasing decisions. This ap-
proach, of allowing consumers some role in choosing the “rules of the game”, appears
to produce a rich framework without a great deal of additional technical complexity.
Our results highlight how market environment and political economy concerns can
subtly impact public investment in infrastructure.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 17
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting equation (4.2) into the winning referendum
equation (4.4) gives





















Solving for I gives the expression for I in Proposition 1. Note the upper bound on R0
is indeed positive if, as assumed,   1. As the discussion preceeding the proposition






















Since I is the maximum of the same quadratic equation which deﬁnes R0 by two
horizontal intercepts it follows that I is exactly half the upper bound of R0 (since
quadratic functions are symmetric).
Proof of Proposition 2. By deﬁnition S0 := fI : I  0;S(I)   S(0)  0g. Using (4.5)
it follows that











































2(1 + ) + 1
(2n)(1 + )
:
Similarly W0 := fI : I  0;W(I)   W(0)  0g. Thus using equation (4.6) we ﬁnd that
W0 : = fI : 0  I 
2
(2n)(1 + )
g = fI : 0  I  2Iwg18 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
where





Proof of Proposition 3. Direct substitution of  = 1 yields I = 5=(4n) = Is, from
which the equality result follows immediately.
From propositions 1 and 2 the upper boundaries of the appropriate sets are simply
double the correspond I value (with lower boundaries all zero). Hence it sufﬁces to














, (21+ + 1)(1 + ) > 2: (7.7)
which holds for all   1 since 21+ + 1 > 2.














which holds because   1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose n ﬁrms cooperatively set a single price p to maximize
industry proﬁts. The value of p that solves this maximization problem is the unique
collusive price.
As ﬁrms have identical costs and are evenly dispersed around the circle C, maxi-
mizing industry proﬁts is equivalent to maximizing proﬁt per ﬁrm. For a given p and




















 if market is not completely covered and 1
2n other-
wise.
First consider p 2 [A  t






















]:POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 19
We ﬁnd that A  c +
t(1+)
(2n) ) A   t
(2n) >
A+c
1+ ) p  
A+c
1+ > 0 ,
d(p;t)
dp < 0 for
all p 2 [A   t
(2n);A]. This implies p = A   t
(2n) maximizes (p;t) in the interval
p 2 [A   t
(2n);A]. Now consider p  A   t
(2n) for which q(p;t) = 1
n. As q(p;t) is
not affected by p, (p;t) is maximized at the highest possible price that satisfy p 
A   t
(2n) which is p = A   t
(2n). Thus at any given t, p = A   t
(2n) maximizes (p;t)
which immediately implies that for all I  0, A  t0 I
(2n)  pc(I) is the unique collusive
price. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Substituting the collusive price pc into the change in indi-










Now on the circle with n ﬁxed we y 2 [0; 1
2n] thus y 
  1
2n
 for all y since   1.
Thus the surplus change for any consumer from an increase in infrastructure un-
der collusion is non-positive and strictly negative for all but the most distant con-
sumer. Therefore all consumers are hurt by infrastructure improvements and hence
R0 = S0 = f0g and I = Is = 0. Notice the collusive price is just sufﬁcient to ensure
that the most distant (lowest surplus from consumption) consumers still purchase.
Thus under collusion all consumers still purchase and hence the effects of infrastruc-
ture improvements on social welfare are the same as under competition just with a
different distribution of beneﬁts. Thus, as in proposition 2, W0 6= f0g and Iw > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Evaluating the median consumer’s change in net surplus
from arbitrarily small levels of investment yields,
lim
I!0












(2   1   )
< 0;
where the strict inequality follows from noting that 2   1    > 0 for all  > 1. Thus
for a given  > 1, there exists I() such that no I < I() beats status quo. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider I > 0. I 2 R0 requires
(7.11) s(ymedian;I)   s(ymedian;0) =  S(I)   s(ymedian;0)  0:
where  S(I) is the expected consumer surplus for median consumer (and in fact all
consumers). For a given  > 1, Let Imax() denote the value of I that maximizes
 S(I). Given the quadratic speciﬁcation of cost of investment, i.e.,
I2
2 , it is easy to
show that (i) Imax() > 0 and (ii) lim!1 Imax() = 0. The latter one , i.e. (ii), imply
that for any given  > 1, there exists () large enough such that Imax() < I()20 ARGHYA GHOSH AND KIERON MEAGHER
whenever  > (). Then the result follows from noting that no I < I() beats status
quo (Proposition 5).

















Since n(I) and p(I) are continuous in I for all I  0, limI!0 S(I)   S(0) = 0. Fur-
thermore,
dS(I)
dI jI=0 = 1
2n(0))(1+) > 0. This implies that there exists strictly positive
investment levels which increases aggregate consumer surplus. Also, since the two
surplus measures are equivalent, it follows that
W0 = S0  f0g; (7.12)




 S(I) > 0 (7.13)
Although expected utility from a positive level of investment is  S(I) for all con-
sumers the expected change in utility varies according to the initial transportation
cost of each consumer. Since transport costs are convex, the transportation costs in-
curred by the median consumer is lower than the average transportation costs in the







Since S(I) =  S(I), we have that S(I)   S(0)   S(I)   s(x
i + 1
4n(0);0) which in turn
implies that S0  R0, where equality only holds for  = 1.
Note that since S(I) =  S(I), the most preferred investment level for any consumer
y, amongst the strictly positive ones is argmaxI>0  S(I) = argmaxI>0 S(I) = Is. If
 S(Is)   s(x
i + 1
4n(0);0)) > 0 then Is = I. Else I = 0 which occurs if  is larger than
a critical value,   say. Obviously, when I = 0, R0 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. If transport costs are linear in distance,  = 1, then the
expected transport costs overall locations are the same as transport costs for the
median voter (in the uniform case the median voter is also the mean voter). Thus, in
the linear case the median voters preferences are the same as the social planner,s and
hence the outcomes of the political process are equivalent to the appropriate welfare
optimal outcomes.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFRASTRUCTURE 21
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